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Changing landscapes 
 
It is early days, but first 
indications are that the global pandemic 
is entrenching long-drawn Middle 
Eastern geopolitical, political, ethnic, 
and sectarian battle lines rather than 
serving as a vehicle to build bridges and 
build confidence. 
The coronavirus crisis is also 
changing the region’s political 
landscape as non-governmental 
organizations and militants in countries 
like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon fill gaps 
where governments have failed to cater 
to social and health needs created by 
the pandemic. 
The empowerment of NGOs and 
militant groups, particularly where they 
fill a gap without coordinating with 
government, potentially raises security 
issues as militants capitalize on their 
ability to show up the state’s lack of 
capability. 
The expanded militants’ role 
takes on added significance as states 
like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates use the pandemic to entrench 
as well as manage many of the Middle 
East’s fault lines, if not widen them to 
their advantage.  
It has also not stopped the 
region’s foremost external power, the 
United States, from taking Iran’s bait in 
an escalating tit-for-tat that risks a 
larger military conflagration. The 
question is for how long. 
In a similar vein, the UAE has 
used the pandemic to solidify its limited 
outreach to Iran designed to shield the 
Gulf state from becoming a battlefield in 
any US-Iranian military confrontation. 
While the United States 
reportedly blocked an Iranian request 
for US5 billion from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to fight the virus, 
the UAE was among the first nations to 
deliver medical aid to Iran and facilitate 
shipments by the World Health 
Organization (WHO). 
The shipments led to a rare 
March 15 phone call between UAE 
foreign minister Abdullah bin Zayed bin 
Sultan Al Nahyan and his Iranian 
counterpart, Mohammad Javid Zarif. 
The UAE began reaching out to 
Iran last year when it sent a coast guard 
delegation to Tehran to discuss 
maritime security in the wake of alleged 
Iranian attacks on oil tankers off the 
coast of the Emirates. 
The Trump administration 
remained silent when the UAE last 
October released US$700 million in 
frozen Iranian assets that ran counter to 
US efforts to strangle Iran economically 
with harsh sanctions. 
The UAE’s moves amount to a 
lowering of the temperature. Officials 
insist that there will be no real 
breakthrough in Emirati-Iranian 
relations as long as Iran supports 
proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon, pro-
Iranian militias in Iraq and Houth rebels 
in Yemen. 
UAE Crown Prince Mohammed 
made that clear when he phoned Syrian 
President Bashar -al-Assad in a bid to 
drive a wedge between Syria and Iran 
and complicate Turkish military 
interventions in Syria as well as Libya. 
UAE support for Syria and 
Libyan rebel forces led by Field 
Marshall Khalifa Haftar spotlight the 
contradictions in the Emirates’ 
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projection of itself as a humanitarian 
actor. Neither Mr. Al-Assad or Mr. 
Haftar have shied away from targeting 
hospitals and medical facilities at a time 
functioning health infrastructure is a 
priority. 
In cuddling up to Syria and 
reaching out to Iran, the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia may have common goals if they 
pursue them in different ways are 
dictated by the degree of risk they are 
willing to shoulder. 
As a result, Saudi Arabia, in 
contrast to the UAE, has maintained a 
hard line toward Iran, casting aside 
opportunities to build bridges by, for 
example, offering Iran medical aid. 
Instead, Saudi Arabia appeared 
to reinforce the divide by accusing Iran 
of “direct responsibility” for the spread 
of the virus. Government-controlled 
media charged that Iran’s allies, Qatar 
and Turkey, had deliberately 
mismanaged the crisis. 
Moreover, the kingdom, backing 
a US refusal to ease sanctioning of Iran, 
prevented the Non-Aligned Movement 
from condemning the Trump 
administration’s hard line at the time of 
a pandemic. 
Saudi Arabia’s failure to follow in 
the UAE’s footsteps could prove to be 
costlier than meets the eye. 
The coronavirus coupled with 
the global economic breakdown and 
the collapse of the oil market has 
somewhat levelled the playing field with 
Iran with the undermining of the 
kingdom’s ability to manipulate oil 
prices as well as its diminished financial 
muscle.  
Add to that the weakening of 
Saudi Arabia’s claim to leadership of 
Islamic world as the custodian of Mecca 
and Medina, Islam’s two holiest cities, 
as a result of its efforts to combat the 
pandemic. 
One has to go way back in 
history to find s precedent for the 
kingdom’s banning of the Umrah, 
Islam’s minor pilgrimage to Mecca; the 
likely cancelling of the haj, Islam’s 
major  pilgrimage that constitutes one of 
the faith’s five pillars; and the closing 
down of mosques to avoid 
congregational prayer. 
Just to make things worse, Saudi 
Arabia has jeopardized its close ties to 
the United States with an oil price war 
against Russia that collapsed oil 
markets, drove oil prices to rock bottom, 
and significantly undermined the US 
shale industry with its ten million jobs. 
Nonetheless, Saudi Crown 
Prince Mohammed bin Salman, in a 
twist of irony given his record om 
human rights and rule of law, has 
emerged as a model in some Muslim 
countries like Pakistan that have been 
less forceful in imposing physical 
distancing and lockdowns on ultra-
conservative religious communities.  
“What if this year’s haj was under 
Imran Khan rather than Mohammad bin 
Salman? Would he have waffled there 
as indeed he has in Pakistan?” asked 
Pakistani nuclear scientist, political 
analyst and human rights activist 
Pervez Hoodbhoy referring to the 
Pakistan prime minister. 
Saudi Arabia has so far carried 
the brunt of US criticism despite the fact 
that it remains more closely aligned with 
US policies than the UAE which to date 
has succeeded in flying under the 
radar. 
That is a remarkable 
achievement given that the Emirates 
backed Saudi Arabia in its debilitating 
price war by announcing that it too 
would raise oil production.  
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The strategy has since been put 
on hold with an agreement to radically 
reduce production among members of 
the Organization of Oil Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), non-OPEC 
producers, including Russia, and the 
Group of Twenty that brings together 
the world’s largest economies. 
In the same vein, the UAE’s 
outreach to Syria and Iran runs counter 
to US policy. 
The policy contradictions stem 
from Gulf efforts to ensure that 
entrenched conflicts do not spiral out of 
control, particularly as they battle a 
pandemic and struggle to cope with the 
economic fallout. 
That is also their core message 
to US President Donald J. Trump amid 
heightening tensions with Iran: “Don’t 
let this get out of hand. You live 
thousands of miles away. It will be us, 
not you who pays the price and you 
won’t be there to rush to our defense,” 
a prominent Saudi told this writer. 
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